In this paper both a Pigovian and an incentive based approach to combat money laundering are studied. The analysis departs from the consensus that financial institutions play a central role in the combat against money laundering since an efficient report system depends on the willingness of banks to cooperate with competent authorities. The paper shows that a Pigovian taxation on the profit of banks that are not committed to report suspicious activities may lead the bank to follow more closely the Basle Convention prescription ‘know your customer’ by reducing the number of banking accounts. The incentive based approach yields an efficient contract if the competent authorities know the type of the institution. The creation of a contract under imperfect information whose aim is to stimulate banks with particular willingness to cooperate faces the shortcoming of hidden information. This may damage the efficiency of the anti-money laundering regulation.
Referência: Universidade Católica de Brasília. Pós-Graduação em Economia (Mestrado e Doutorado). Working paper nº 07/002, setembro de 2007.
Acesse aqui: moneylaundering-2007
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